

Appendix 1

The Regulation of Investigatory Powers 2000 and the use of social media and internet.

1. Introduction

- 1.1** Guidance on the use of social media is provided in the Covert Surveillance and Property Interference revised code of practise 2018, it states:
- 1.2** "The growth of the internet, and the extent of the information that is now available online, presents new opportunities for public authorities to view or gather information which may assist them in preventing or detecting crime or carrying out other statutory functions, as well as in understanding and engaging with the public they serve. It is important that public authorities are able to make full and lawful use of this information for their statutory purposes. Much of it can be accessed without the need for RIPA authorisation; use of the internet prior to an investigation should not normally engage privacy considerations. But if the study of an individual's online presence becomes persistent, or where material obtained from any check is to be extracted and recorded and may engage privacy considerations, RIPA authorisations may need to be considered.
- 1.3** The internet may be used for intelligence gathering and/or as a surveillance tool. Where online monitoring or investigation is conducted covertly for the purpose of a specific investigation or operation and is likely to result in the obtaining of private information about a person or group, an authorisation for directed surveillance should be considered, as set out elsewhere in this code. Where a person acting on behalf of a public authority is intending to engage with others online without disclosing his or her identity, a CHIS authorisation may be needed
- 1.4** In deciding whether online surveillance should be regarded as covert, consideration should be given to the likelihood of the subject(s) knowing that the surveillance is or may be taking place. Use of the internet itself may be considered as adopting a surveillance technique calculated to ensure that the subject is unaware of it, even if no further steps are taken to conceal the activity. Conversely, where reasonable steps have been taken to inform the public or particular individuals that the surveillance is or may be taking place, the activity may be regarded as overt and a directed surveillance authorisation will not normally be available.
- 1.5** Depending on the nature of the online platform, there may be a reduced expectation of privacy where information relating to a person or group of people is made openly available within the public domain, however in some circumstances privacy implications still apply. This is because the intention when making such information available was not for it to be used for a covert purpose such as investigative activity. This is regardless of whether a user of a website or social media platform has sought to protect such information by restricting its access by activating privacy settings.

- 1.6** Where information about an individual is placed on a publicly accessible database, for example the telephone directory or Companies House, which is commonly used and known to be accessible to all, they are unlikely to have any reasonable expectation of privacy over the monitoring by public authorities of that information. Individuals who post information on social media networks and other websites whose purpose is to communicate messages to a wide audience are also less likely to hold a reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to that information.
- 1.7** Whether a public authority interferes with a person's private life includes a consideration of the nature of the public authority's activity in relation to that information. Simple reconnaissance of such sites (i.e. preliminary examination with a view to establishing whether the site or its contents are of interest) is unlikely to interfere with a person's reasonably held expectation of privacy and therefore is not likely to require a directed surveillance authorisation. But where a public authority is systematically collecting and recording information about a particular person or group, a directed surveillance authorisation should be considered. These considerations apply regardless of when the information was shared online".

2. Using social media

- 2.1** Officers should not use their own private social networking account to view the accounts of others during the course of their duties.
- 2.2** One off or infrequent visits to an individual's social media profile over a period of time will not be considered directed surveillance and will not therefore normally require a RIPA authorisation provided the visit is not prolonged and is not used to gather large quantities of data about an individual, such as trying to establish their movements for a period of time.
- 2.3** Where it is considered frequent visits to an individual's social media profile may be required, officers should ensure that they follow the RIPA policy to obtain the necessary authorisation.
- 2.4** Officers should maintain a log of visits to the social media profile accessed with the case notes of the investigation so that this can be monitored.
- 2.5** Any information obtained from social media profiles should be copied and or a screen shot taken and held with the case notes, ensuring that the information is held securely and complies with the data protection and retention policy appropriate to the service.